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Political systems often invent comforting words and phrases to
cover their purposes — and sometimes also their shortcomings.
In the United States, “The New Deal,” “The New Frontier,” and
“The Great Society” are familiar examples. They have their
counterparts in most other parts of the world. Of course, the
interplay of rhetoric and reality is the essence of politics, and
such phrases have their political utility. Perhaps no such phrase
is as comprehensive — and so overworked — as “the interna-
tional community,” a concept that is also the subject of this
roundtable.
When cover is needed for an uncertain international situation;
when a nation’s foreign policy is being questioned, when practi-
cal involvement in a foreign situation is politically unpopular at
home, when it is necessary to show that a government is not
indecisive or alone; when the appearance of action is needed but
real action has to be avoided; when no one really knows what on
earth is going on—at all of these times you can be sure that
political leaders around the world will invoke the “international
community” and its alleged will, its Olympian cadence, its pur-
ported actions, and its splendidly vague intentions. What a god-
send it is.
The reality of the international community is more elusive,
and never more so than when you consider the basic characteris-
tics of a community as normally understood. Taken at their sim-
plest, those characteristics are the following: accepted rules of
conduct and effective institutions; common responsibility for all
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members of the community; and a shared view of the future. Of
course, a working community at any level only emerges gradu-
ally by practical experiment and precedent, and, presumably, if
there is to be an international community, it will follow the same
process.
How does the United Nations, the framework of the “interna-
tional community” so often invoked by politicians, measure up
to these simple criteria? Or, to put it in another way, how has the
world organization lived up to its billing as what Dag Ham-
marskjöld thirty-five years ago called “a venture in progress
towards an international community living in peace under laws
of justice”? An answer to this question requires a quick and very
brief look at the United Nations and the challenges that confront
it.
II. The United Nations Organization at a Crossroads
In 1945, the primary purpose of the United Nations was, by con-
certing the policies of states, to avoid a recurrence of the disas-
ters of the 1920s and 1930s that had led to the Second World
War. These disasters were economic depression and collapse;
fascism and other forms of totalitarianism; the arms race;
aggression; and, finally, world war. The United Nations Charter
also added new elements — economic and social development
for all, human rights, decolonization, and the development of
international law.
Naturally enough, the founders at San Francisco did not fore-
see many of the most important future developments, quite
apart from the Cold War itself. They did not foresee the conse-
quences of a world without empires and the increase in mem-
bership of the United Nations from 50 nations in 1945 to 184 in
1994. They did not foresee that the world’s population would
more than double in the next fifty years. In 1945, instant commu-
nication of all kinds and other great technological break-
throughs were only in the very distant future. At San Francisco,
it seemed that governments were all-powerful, and the founders
certainly did not foresee the erosion of governmental authority
and control and the growth of the private sector in such matters
as international capital markets or the enormous proliferation of
nongovernmental organizations. The possibility that some states
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would actually fail was not even considered at San Francisco,
nor was the growing threat to the environment, to our life sup-
port system on the planet, and to our common resources, even
those which had hitherto been taken for granted, such as water,
air, and food.
Perhaps the greatest difference, however, between 1945 and
1994 is one of attitude and mood. In 1945, in spite of World War
II, there was great optimism about the future. Under the direc-
tion of President Franklin Roosevelt, postwar planning had
started right at the beginning of the war, so that by the end there
was a complete blueprint for the postwar world. At its center
was the United Nations system — the U.N. itself, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, and the specialized agencies. This blue-
print was a grand gesture of statesmanship and vision and it
was to be led by the United States, then incomparably the most
powerful and richest country in the world — also, I might add,
the most benevolent. In 1945, there was great confidence, even
arrogance, about this new international system, and skepticism
was indignantly rejected. As a neophyte civilian in the Prepara-
tory Commission of the United Nations, having just spent six
years in the British Army, I remember being strongly rebuked
by Alger Hiss, who had been the secretary-general of the San
Francisco conference, for expressing some mild skepticism
about whether the behavior of governments would in fact
change as fundamentally as was suggested in the U.N. Charter.
This mood of confidence and optimism, in fact, lasted about one
year. Then, the Cold War and governmental business as usual
took over with a vengeance.
In 1994, by contrast, in spite of much good fortune and rela-
tive peace in the world, there is a sour and uncertain mood,
especially regarding governments and international organiza-
tions. There is a widespread bewilderment, anxiety, and lack of
confidence about the future. There is a noticeable lack of direc-
tion and leadership, especially in international affairs, and gov-
ernments are cautious and reluctant to join in great international
endeavors. There seems to be an aversion to long-term vision
and to long-term projects both nationally and internationally. It
is hard to imagine getting the Marshall Plan through the United
States Congress today. Much of this mood is easily expressed by
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constant griping at the United Nations. Unlike 1945, there is no
post–Cold War blueprint for the world of the future.
Partly as a result of this mood, the media make much of the
running in politics and have an enormous influence on action to
be taken—or not to be taken—in given circumstances. As in the
disastrous 1930s, governments are averse to involvement in con-
flicts abroad. With one or two notable exceptions, they tend to
be pushed by the media and public opinion, late and often inef-
fectively, into whatever international involvement they are pre-
pared reluctantly to accept. There is an increasing reluctance to
risk the lives of soldiers in any situation whatsoever and a paral-
lel reluctance to pay for international organization. It is worth
noting that the entire United Nations system—including peace-
keeping and humanitarian emergency work — last year cost $2
per capita of the world population in a year when expenditure
on arms cost $150 per capita. Governments’ assessments for
U.N. peacekeeping run at about $1 in every $1,100 for national
defense, and yet it is the U.N. operations and the U.N. soldiers
that are usually in the forefront and taking the risks.
While there is a great unwillingness to strengthen signifi-
cantly or empower the United Nations, there remains an irre-
sistible urge to dump insoluble problems and emergencies on
the organization. The U.N. also, as always, provides a useful
scapegoat and fig leaf for the unwillingness of governments to
act. The situation in Bosnia is a classic example of this phenome-
non. Thus, the “U.N. Renaissance” of only five years ago has
turned into a great disillusionment.
We know all too well that in an interdependent world with
modern communications, great human problems and disasters
cannot be ignored. We also know that the future of the human
race in decent conditions almost certainly depends on tackling
various global problems — poverty, population, the environ-
ment, the economy, the question of law and order, and so on.
We know better than ever before what we have to pool our
efforts to deal with. Among other things, we have to achieve a
reasonable degree of peace and order; create more equitable
forms of economic activity; control pollution and climate
change; monitor and control disease; reduce the trade in lethal
weapons; address the problem of desertification; maintain bio-
logical diversity; halt the plagues of terrorism, famine, drugs
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and crime; and so on. The list is a long one. The question that
occurs to me more and more often is: What are we waiting for?
We are, unquestionably, whether we like it or not, in a period
of transition from the 1945 association of sovereign states
toward the international community that Hammarskjöld spoke
of thirty-five years ago. In fact, many of the United Nations’ pre-
sent tribulations spring from the difficulties of this transition.
The question is whether the world organization will come
through successfully to a new and far more effective identity
and role.
The United Nations was set up primarily to deal with con-
flicts between states, and it was quite specifically to stay out of
internal conflicts. Now, however, the function of most of the
emergency operations of the United Nations is to deal with civil
and ethnic conflict and violence within the borders of states or
failed states. Because of this, the public and the media see the
U.N. more and more as the public service sector of an embryonic
world community, and, naturally enough, they deplore its fail-
ings in this role. Governments, on the other hand, are reluctant
to give the U.N. either the capacity or the mandate to carry out
this new task. Indeed, the organization’s future may well
depend upon governments agreeing to empower it not only to
deal with conflict and human disaster but also to cope with the
major economic and social issues of our time, that is to say to
undertake the assault on the root problems of instability. It
would certainly be helpful if the member governments of the
United Nations would take advantage of the fiftieth anniversary
of the organization to address this basic question of role and
identity.
III. Assessment of Criteria for Community
Before I continue, allow me to recall again the record on the
three simple criteria for community over the past fifty years:
accepted rules and institutions, common responsibility for all
members, and a shared view of the future.
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A. Rules and Institutions
A great deal has been done in terms of formulating rules and
institutions. There is the United Nations Charter with its objec-
tives and principles, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and many human rights conventions. There are count-
less conventions and treaties, including the monumental Law of
the Sea Treaty. In fact, more international law has been promul-
gated in the past forty-five years than in all of the rest of
recorded history. There are Security Council resolutions, some
of which are legally binding. There is also much rhetoric about
the importance of the rule of law in international life. However,
there is not much sign yet of an international legal system. Mon-
itoring of international law is extremely rare and enforcement
virtually nonexistent. The precedent of enforcing the final reso-
lution on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the time, trouble, and
expense that had been needed to carry that through are indica-
tive of the size of the job of monitoring and enforcing interna-
tional law worldwide.
There are, however, some encouraging straws in the wind.
The recent United States operation in Haiti, for example, is in
pursuit of a Security Council resolution and aims to restore
democracy after an election that was monitored and approved
by the United Nations and was overthrown by force. The opera-
tion is also intended to restore the protection of human rights.
The war crimes commissions that have been set up for Bosnia
and Rwanda, ineffective as they are at present, again point to the
beginnings of an international legal regime. The El Salvador set-
tlement contains many remarkable innovations, including a
commission on the truth and international human rights moni-
toring teams. There is also now increasing interest in establish-
ing a United Nations criminal court and even a human rights
court. Although there is much talk about strengthening the
International Court of Justice and increasing its involvement in
matters of peace and security, at the moment the court remains
strangely aloof from the day-to-day crises of the world.
Although a start has been made, there is obviously a very long
way to go toward a real system of respected rules and laws in
the world at large.
As far as institutions are concerned, those related to interna-
tional peace and security tend to get the most attention. The
Macalester International Vol. 1
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Security Council can now reach agreement on almost all the
problems that come before it, which is certainly a major
improvement. Its problem, however, is to implement its deci-
sions, without which it will become more or less an empty
sounding board. In implementing Security Council decisions,
the peacekeeping technique developed over the previous fifty
years is fine up to a point, but its application is extremely lim-
ited since peacekeeping depends upon the willingness of the
conflicting parties to keep the peace. At the other end of the
scale, as Desert Storm has shown, it is possible for major
enforcement actions to be mounted if the political circumstances
are right. But, between these two poles, there is a great gray area
of civil and ethnic violence for which the United Nations has no
convincing capacity or means to deal with. At present, there is
not even agreement on the extent of the responsibility of the
United Nations for this very prevalent form of violence, so its
interventions are often dictated by the media and the public.
There are no rules for dealing with failed states. There is also a
widespread antipathy to United Nations intervention in very
large parts of the world. The Clinton Administration’s Presiden-
tial Directive 25 is as good an exposition as any of the problems
of international involvement when no threat to the national
security is involved. And yet the international community so
often invoked can never come into existence without a doctrine
of common international responsibility. I believe that this is the
kind of basic question that needs to be talked out publicly by
governments without euphemisms, circumlocutions, or gim-
micks.
B. Common Responsibility
Quite apart from the question of responsibility, the U.N.’s
capacity to respond is extremely limited. The new concept of
“peace enforcement” has not proved to be a happy experiment
in either Bosnia or Somalia. The combination of peacekeeping,
enforcement, humanitarian relief, and the monitoring of human
rights has also proved to be a very complicated one. No one
really knows how to cope with genocide or to foresee the kind of
events that trigger it, such as, for example, the shooting down of
the presidential aircraft in Rwanda.
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The United Nations’ capacity for responding to such disasters
is grossly inadequate. It has little or no infrastructure for contin-
gency planning, logistics, training, or command and control,
and it is only just beginning to develop some of these essential
features. The United Nations has no reserve funds for peace-
keeping. All operations have to start from scratch and on a shoe-
string. Under these circumstances, it is something of a miracle
that the United Nations has managed to maintain and go for-
ward with its eighteen current operations in the field.
Perhaps most limiting of all, the U.N. is entirely dependent
upon its member states for troops and other support for opera-
tions. As governments become more wary of international
involvement, uncertainties and disastrous delays in deployment
will only get worse, and as a result the U.N. will not get
involved in a critical situation until long after it has gotten com-
pletely out of hand.
The United Nations has no built-in capacity for immediate
deployment. One has only to think of a police force that has to
wait for weeks before going to the scene of the crime to under-
stand how debilitating this is. The U.N.’s representatives tend to
go into violent situations without protection. Thus, the trainers
and monitors on the Harlan County last year were turned back at
the dock in Port-au-Prince by a relatively minor demonstration.
These shortcomings have had a dismal effect on the respect for
and credibility of the United Nations. I personally believe that
the best and perhaps only way to deal with this vital problem is
to set up a relatively small, highly trained U.N. volunteer force
for immediate deployment. This would be a force recruited from
the best volunteers all over the world and trained to the highest
military and peacekeeping standards. It might, perhaps, have an
initial strength of between 5,000 and 10,000 people. It would
serve as the spearhead of the Security Council in immediately
representing its decisions on the ground and preparing the way
for the larger, more conventional U.N. forces that would come
after it. It would in no sense be a substitute for peacekeeping,
peace enforcement, or combat forces.
There are many objections to such a proposal, and they are
virtually identical to the objections that were made in Britain in
the 1830s to Sir Robert Peel’s proposal of a national police force.
It has been argued that a U.N. volunteer force would give the
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Security Council and the secretary-general too much power to
intervene; that it would interfere with local authorities; that its
people would be little better than mercenaries; and that it would
be expensive. Of course, governments are likely to be averse to
any move that gives the U.N. itself a built-in autonomy and
makes it less dependent upon them. If the force were under the
control of the Security Council it would be difficult to sustain
such an objection. As for expense, there is nothing either effec-
tive or inexpensive about the large, belated, and inefficient inter-
ventions to which the U.N. has been reduced in Somalia and
Rwanda, to name only two cases. There is one insuperable argu-
ment in favor of a volunteer international force. The future of
the United Nations as an effective element in maintaining a min-
imal degree of law and stability in the world may depend on it,
and its introduction could well be a turning point in the history
of the organization.
In the economic and social fields, there has been little
progress in creating respected international institutions,
although much has been done in the fields of development and
human rights as well as in transnational movements such as
women’s rights, the environment, family planning, and so on.
Here, again, there is a strong need for respected rules and effec-
tive institutions of an equitable kind that recognize the whole
world as their constituency. We should never forget that, at the
present time, 1.4 billion people in the world live below the
poverty level. I hope very much that the fiftieth anniversary of
the U.N. will, among other things, be the occasion for the high-
est possible level of discussion about what can and should be
done to meet the demands of the world economy and its least
favored constituents.
I believe that the idea of common international responsibility
has developed to an extraordinary degree in the past fifty years,
thanks mostly to nongovernmental organizations, public opin-
ion, and the media. Although politicians are reluctant to accept
what could well become open-ended responsibilities, there
seems to have been a fairly radical shift of viewpoint among the
public about what has to be done when large segments of the
human race are suffering.
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C. Shared View
As far as a shared view of the future is concerned, it seems to me
that the question is basically rather simple, especially in our
favored, industrialized part of the world. We now have very
accurate projections of what is likely to happen to our environ-
ment and even to our level of civilization if existing trends con-
tinue. In the fortunate, industrialized world, we have two basic
options. The first is to hole up, to protect our advantages as best
we can, to worry about our diminishing numbers, to consume
ourselves to death, and to try to keep the vast majority of the
less fortunate out of our privileged but shrinking paradise. If
that is our choice, we can forget about “international commu-
nity” except as a rhetorical device and let the U.N. muddle on as
it is, doing damage control, serving as a dumping ground for
impossible problems and a place to let off steam, and providing
a useful scapegoat and fig leaf.
There is, however, another option. We can, like our predeces-
sors in 1945, aspire to make a success of the future. If we are to
do this, it will take all our ingenuity, energy, and experience as
well as considerable resources. It will be a very long haul. It
should also be an inspiring mission to be involved in. It should
be fun. At least it would remove our couch potato feeling that
life has become rather meaningless and dull. It might also put to
rest the notion of “the end of history” and all that.
If that is our chosen option, the U.N. system — renewed,
streamlined, reinvigorated, and, above all, properly led — could
provide the framework for the grandest of human adventures:
building a successful future in a world community under laws
of justice.
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